WOG BLOG

:: Wog Blog ::

:: WHAT AM I THINKING ABOUT? ::

:: Welcome. This blog will present a wog perspective on matters. And this wog will decide what matters.:: ::bloghome:: | ::contact::
::WOG FROG(&SPAIN) 2006::
:: Day 1 of 14 - Start Here
::WOG MOG LEJOG 2005::
:: Day 0 of 14 - Start Here
::WOG ON THE ROAD 2004::
:: Day 1 of 10 - Start Here
::NORMBLOG PROFILE 84::
:: Wog Blogger Profile
::A Few Recommended Oz Blogs::
:: Tim Blair
:: Belmont Club
:: Silent Running
:: Bernard Slattery
:: Tony the Teacher
:: Yobbo
:: Adrian the Cabbie
:: Andrew Bolt
:: Romeo Mike
::A Few Recommended News Sites::
:: News Now
:: Sydney Morning Herald
:: The Daily Telegraph
:: The Australian
:: The Financial Review
:: Atlantic Monthly
:: Drudge Report
:: Counterterrorism Blog
::A Few Recommended US Blogs::
:: Jules Crittenden
:: Glenn Reynolds
:: James Lileks
:: Little Green Footballs
:: The Corner
:: Matt Welch
:: Ken Layne
:: Stephen Green
:: Eugene Volokh
:: Iraq Now
:: Jeff Goldstein
:: Powerline
:: Opera Chick
::A Few Recommended Italian Blogs::
:: 1972
:: I Love America
:: Il Foglio
:: Il Nouvo Riformista
:: Wind Rose Hotel
:: Libero Pensiero
:: Beppe Grillo
::A Few Recommended UK Blogs::
:: Oxblog
:: Harry's Place
:: Theo Spark
:: Tuscan Tony
:: Biased BBC
:: Melanie Phillips
:: Oliver Kamm
:: Samizdata
:: Harry Hutton
:: Norman Geras
:: Tim Worstall
:: Freedom & Whisky
::A Few Recommended Other Blogs::
:: Gates of Vienna
:: EurSoc
:: Iberian Notes
:: Healing Iraq
:: Baghdad Burning
:: The Messopotamian
:: Mahmood's Den
:: No Pasaran!Merde in France
:: Dissident Frogman
:: The Head Heeb
[::Archives::]
November 2002 December 2002 January 2003 February 2003 March 2003 April 2003 May 2003 June 2003 July 2003 August 2003 September 2003 October 2003 November 2003 December 2003 January 2004 February 2004 March 2004 April 2004 May 2004 July 2004 August 2004 September 2004 October 2004 November 2004 December 2004 January 2005 February 2005 March 2005 April 2005 May 2005 June 2005 July 2005 August 2005 December 2005 January 2006 February 2006 April 2006 June 2006 September 2006 October 2006 November 2006 May 2007 August 2007 September 2007 October 2007 November 2007 December 2007 March 2008 April 2008 May 2008 June 2008 July 2008 August 2008 September 2008 November 2008 April 2009 May 2009 October 2009 April 2010 May 2012

:: Monday, 2 May 2005 ::

Calipari's death - the leaked report

3. (U) 14 March 2005 Report
(U) A forensic examination of the car was performed after its removal from the scene. This analysis disclosed 11 entrance bullet holes. They are consistent with 7.62 mm bullets. Three bullets perforated the front section of the car at the bumper, right head light, and right fender. Two bullets perforated the windshield. Six bullets perforated the right side, right door, right front and rear passenger windows. No bullet holes or ricochet damage was noted on the car’s undercarriage. (Annex 1I).
(U) The trajectory analysis demonstrated that all 11 bullets came from one point of origin. The actual distance from the car to the machine gun could not be conclusively determined because of several variables: the grade of the curve and curvature of the roadway; depressions or elevations of the terrain; the lateral movement of the car; human reaction time, modulation of speed and braking by the driver; a flat tire; and lateral and vertical movement of the machine gun. The security situation at the incident site prevented examiners from visiting the scene. (Annex 1I).


4. (U) BP 541 Traffic Samples
(U) On Friday, 25 March 2005, a certified radar operator conducted two traffic samples at BP 541. From 1809 hours to 1824 hours, 27 vehicles were clocked. The average speed at the Alert Line was 44 mph. The average speed at the beginning of the on-ramp’s curve was 24 mph. From 1956 hours to 2015 hours, 30 vehicles were clocked. The average speed at the Alert Line was 46 mph. The average speed at the beginning of the curve was 26 mph. Unlike the night of the incident, which was also a Friday, the road was dry during these samples. (Annex 1M).
5. (U) Number of Rounds
(U) The ammunition box in the blocking vehicle originally contained 200 rounds. There were 142 rounds remaining in the M240B ammunition box. No casings were collected. Eleven rounds hit the vehicle. The weapon had been fired on seven previous occasions using the same ammunition box. As such, there were no more than 40 additional rounds that could have been fired. (Annexes 85C, 99C).


...

(U) Specialist Lozano spotlighted the car before it reached the Alert Line, fired warning shots as it reached the Warning Line, and fired on the vehicle in an attempt to disable it immediately after it crossed the Warning Line. (Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C, 134C).
(U) Specialist Lozano was the only one to fire his weapon. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 87C, 89C).
(U) The car was traveling at approximately 50 mph as it crossed the Warning Line. (Annex 83C).
(U) Mr. Carpani did not apply his brakes until after the rounds began striking the car. (Annexes 104C, 105C).
(U) Given the cyclic rate of fire of the M240B, Specialist Lozano’s expertise with the weapon, and that only 11 rounds struck the vehicle with only five of those impacting the front of the car, it is highly unlikely that any shots were fired after the car came to a stop. (Annexes 79C, 6G, 1I, 3M).


...

The gunner complied with the Rules of Engagement. After operating the spotlight, and perceiving the on-coming vehicle as a threat, he fired to disable it and did not intend to harm anyone in the vehicle. (Annexes 79C, 83C).
(U) There were a number of unrelated events that had a role in the incident. These were: (1) bad weather forcing a VIP to convoy on Route Irish that evening vice the preferred method of traveling by helicopter; (2) communications problems involving a unit new to the AOR that caused the Soldiers to be left in position longer than expected; (3) the recovery of Ms. Sgrena being pushed back daily, for several days, to 4 March 2005; (4) the Italians did not know the Soldiers were at the on-ramp, and were not expecting any such roadblocks; and (5) the Soldiers did not know the Italians were traveling to BIAP. (Annexes 51C, 52C, 57C, 59C, 60C, 61C, 63C, 97C, 104C, 105C, 107C, 109C, 116C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C).
(U) Mr. Carpani was driving faster than any other vehicle observed by the Soldiers that evening. He failed to stop for the spotlight since he was not expecting a roadblock. Additionally, he was dealing with multiple distractions including talking on the phone while driving, the conversation in the back seat, trying to listen for threats, driving on a wet road, focusing on tasks to be accomplished, the need to get to the airport, and the excited and tense atmosphere in the car. (Annexes 104C, 105C, 125C, 140C). Any one of these would have affected his reaction time.


Naturally the Americans blame the Italian driver - albeit in fairly sensitive language.

Carpani was driving at 'approx 50 miles an hour'.

The road block was on an on-ramp at a tight curve.

One US soldier fired 51 bullets, 11 of them entering the car, one or two killing Calipari.

This is just awful and of course, I take the side of the Italians. You are nothing if you cannot be loyal to your life.

Just awful.
:: WB 5:47 am [link+] ::

This page is powered by Blogger. Isn't yours?
This page is powered by Blogger. Isn't yours?